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Abstract. In this paper I suggest that, over and above the need to ex-
plore and understand the technological newness of computer art works,
there is a need to address the aesthetic signiﬁcance of the changes and ef-
fects that such technological newness brings about, considering the whole
environmental transaction pertaining to new media, including what they
can or do offer and what users do or can do with such offerings, and how
this whole package is integrated into our living spaces and activities. I ar-
gue that, given the primacy of computer-based interaction in the new me-
dia, the notion of ‘ornamentality’ indicates the ground-ﬂoor aesthetics of
new-media environments. I locate ornamentality not only in the logically
constitutive principles of the new media (hypertextuality and interactivity)
but also in their multiform cultural embodiments (decoration as cultural
interface). I utilize Kendall Walton’s theory of ornamentality in order to
construe a puzzle pertaining to the ornamental erosion of information in
new-media environments. I argue that insofar as we consider newmedia to
be conduits of ‘real life’, the excessive density of ornamental devices preval-
ent in certain new-media environments forces us to conduct our inquiries
under conditions of neustic uncertainty, that is, uncertainty concerning
the kind of relationship that we, the users, have to the propositional con-
tent mediated. I conclude that this puzzle calls our attention to a peculiar
interrogatory complexity inherent in any game of knowledge-seeking con-
ducted across the infosphere, which is not restricted to the simplest form
of data retrieval, especially in mixed-reality environments and when the
knowledge sought is embodied mimetically. I suggest that this puzzle calls
us to consider what would be a viable logic of virtual discovery.
In recent years there has been an upsurge in discussions of various forms of
computer art. Quite expectedly, the recent literature has chieﬂy focused
on the need for, and the ensuing difficulties in, demarcating computer art
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as sui generis, that is, on the challenge of arguing that computers provide a
newmedium for art, rather than simply being a new vehicle for displaying art.
Standard debates concerning the value and the art-status of such purported
works of art follow naturally from such attempts to answer the classic ‘what
is it?’ question.
I have no quarrel with the current debate concerning computer art as
it stands. Rather, in the ﬁrst part of my paper, I would like to tease out
of this present concern yet another concern, which I believe to be more
fundamental and, dare I say, more forward-looking.
There is common agreement on the pivotal role of the notion of compu-
ter-based interactivity for any complete understanding of computer art.
According to Dominic McIver Lopes, ‘computer art works exploit the
technology of computing in order to achieve interactivity. […] Computer-
based interactivity is the special feature that distinguishes computer art
from digital art and indeed all the other arts’ (Lopes 2010, p. 27).
However, there is a tinge of technological essentialism in Lopes’ under-
scoring of ‘computer-based’ in the phrase ‘computer-based interactivity’,
one which I would like to resist right at the outset. By technological es-
sentialism Imean the tendency to identify the speciﬁcity of amediumwith
its underlying technology. Lopes uses the following working deﬁnition for
interactivity as pertaining to computer art: ‘a work of art is interactive to
the degree that the actions of its users help generate its display (in pre-
scribed ways)’ (Lopes 2010, p. 37); hence ‘a user interacts with a work of
art just in case he or she acts so as to generate its display in a prescribed
manner’ (ibid.).
I believe that an air of technological essentialism generates some con-
fusion here about the purported newness of computer-based interactiv-
ity as designating the speciﬁcity of the computer art medium. We or-
dinarily speak of computer-based interactivity quite literally, as consist-
ing in physical interaction—real or simulated—between the user and her
gadget: pressing a button, choosing a link, cutting, pasting, dragging an
icon and so on. Yet, as Lev Manovich has pointed out, classical as well
as ‘old’ modern media—literary and dramatic narratives, visual and three-
dimensional representations, works of music, architecture, and cinema, to
adduce the most obvious examples—are all interactive in the sense that
they invite or hinge upon cognitive processes of ﬁlling-in, hypothesis form-
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ation, recall and identiﬁcation, etc. (Manovich 2000, pp. 55-61). In this
sense, computer-based interactivity is not that different from what we
have long been familiar with, and restricting ourselves to technological
newness amounts to taking a one-sided view of a much richer picture—
that of the enmeshment of our minds and lives in the technology. Involved
here is a wholly different sense, indeed a wholly different scope of newness.
One should be reminded of the prophetic words of new-media pioneer
Douglas Engelbart, who on the brink of the digital revolution advised his
peers to transcend technological essentialism. ‘We do not speak of isolated
clever tricks that help in particular situations,’ Engelbart wrote. ‘We refer
to a way of life in an integrated domain where hunches, cut-and-try, intan-
gibles, and the human “feel for a situation” usefully co-exist with powerful
concepts, streamlined terminology and notation, sophisticated methods,
and high-powered electronic aids’ (Engelbart 1962, p. 1).
So with regard to Lopes’ starting point there is actually another dif-
ﬁculty, which is broader and deeper. Information and communication
technology (ICT), in which computer art inheres, is currently in a state of
ﬂux, surging toward and perhaps even past the threshold of what Luciano
Floridi identiﬁes in a recent book as ‘the fourth revolution’ (Floridi 2014).
According to Floridi, the upheavals caused by the transformative insights
of Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud have now been followed by a fourth
revolution, associated with the work of Allan Turing, who ‘displaced us
from our privileged and unique position in the realm of logical reasoning,
information processing, and smart behavior’ (93). Floridi writes:
We are slowly accepting the post-Turing idea that we are not Newto-
nian, stand-alone, and unique agents, some Robinson Crusoe on an
island. Rather, we are informational organisms (inforgs), mutually
connected and embedded in an informational environment (the in-
fosphere), which we share with other informational agents, both nat-
ural and artiﬁcial, that also process information logically and autonom-
ously. (94)
To understand any technology, Floridi reminds us, we need to acknow-
ledge its characteristic of ‘in-betweenness’ (25-34). Any technology is al-
ways situated between an interacting user and a prompter—that which
prompts the user to interact with the technology. (Note: a prompter
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is a patently environmental concept. This will become important as my
discussion unfolds.) This ‘in-betweenness’ can be of the ﬁrst, second, or
third order. When technologies are in-between human users and natural
prompters (e.g., an umbrella), we may qualify them as ﬁrst order. Second-
order technologies are those relating users no longer to nature but to other
technologies; that is, they are technologies whose prompters are other
technologies (e.g., an engine which provides energy to other technologies).
Third-order technologies, the hallmark of the current revolutionary leap,
relate technologies-as-users to other technologies-as-prompters. This is
where ‘we, who are the users, are no longer in the loop, but at most on the
loop […] Or perhaps we are not signiﬁcantly present at all, that is, we are
out of the loop entirely, and enjoy or simply rely on such technologies as
(possibly unaware) beneﬁciaries or consumers’ (30).
Against the backdrop of this threefold analysis of the very idea of tech-
nology, Lopes’ working deﬁnition of interactivity as pertaining to com-
puter art appears to be a truncated conception. There is no reference
to prompters at all. Of course, in Lopes’ notion of ‘a prescribed manner’
there is an implicit reference to the artist as prompter. Yet if the artist of
a computer artwork stands in the same relation to her creation as that of
the computer programmer to her software, or that of an engineer to her
machine, then this will not do. When we use information and communic-
ation technology (of either the ﬁrst or the second order) the prompter is
either nature or another technology, not the person (or persons) who en-
gineered it. The latter idea sounds a bit like Molière’s famous gag in The
Imaginary Invalid that opium induces sleep because there is ‘a dormitive
power’ in it.
Either way, Lopes’ working deﬁnition seems to be distancing itself
from the idea of ﬁrst-order ICT. After all, we visit museums and other-
wise artiﬁcially circumscribed venues to experience (that is, to use) com-
puter art. Yet there remains ambiguity concerning the notion of a ‘user’
between second- and third-order ICTs. Unqualiﬁed, we can see that the
revolutionary shift from second- to third-order ICTs would ultimately as-
similate computer art, thus deﬁned, into the very fabric of the informa-
tional environment to the exclusion of human agency—the user can be a
technology and the display can be machine-readable data. But then, is it
art? And for whom?
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Of course, this is in itself just a reductio ad absurdum. Clearly, Lopes
wishes to retain human agency in the loop, and so do we.
Still, if we wish to retain human agency in the conception of com-
puter art, then under the conditions of the ‘fourth revolution’ we must
consider the vast changes to the very conception of human life which en-
sue from the fundamental anthropological fact that ICTs have positioned
themselves from the get-go as technologies of the self, deeply affecting
the informational patterns in which increasingly larger domains of our life
inhere (Floridi uses the catchy term ‘onlife’)—our informational nature,
our activities, our memories or narratives. Our onlife experience presup-
poses that we are our own information, and this brave-new-world idea has
already had extensive repercussions concerning embodiment, space, time,
memory and interactions, perception, health, and education.
So, again: if we wish to retain human agency in the conception of com-
puter art, and also introduce the counterpart notion of a prompter in addi-
tion to that of a user, as necessitated by a proper analysis of the notion
of technology, then, under the conditions of the ‘fourth revolution’, the
theoretical onus in aesthetics is bound to shift to the onlife experience, to
the enmeshment of human life in ICTs, that is, to an aesthetics of newme-
dia environments, rather than an aesthetics of discrete occasions of what we
might call ‘art’ or, alternatively, even unwittingly, ‘technology’. In the last
analysis, an onlife conception of computer art is patently environmental.
Given the aforementioned concerns, I draw some inspiration, and also
courage, from John Dewey’s famous qualm concerning what he called ‘the
museum conception of art’ (Dewey 1980), by which he meant the com-
partmentalization of the aesthetic so that it was separate from real life,
remitted it to its own realm, remote from vital ordinary interests. I sug-
gest that an oﬄife conception of computer art (to adduce an ad hoc ant-
onym to Floridi’s notion of onlife), which Lopes’ book exempliﬁes, is ana-
logous to Dewey’s notion of ‘the museum conception of art’. From the per-
spective of the ‘fourth revolution’, indeed from the vantage point of those
born after 9/11 who belong to so-called Generation Z, an offlife concep-
tion of computer art would appear quite constrained, a relic of a receding
paradigm. It rests on cultural conditions that have been rapidly eroding
over the last seventy years with increasing acceleration and with no sign
of abating.
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I conclude this part of my paper by saying that over and above the
need to explore and appreciate the technological newness of computer art
works, there is a need to address the aesthetic signiﬁcance of the changes
and effects that such technological newness brings about, considering the
whole environmental transaction pertaining to new media, including what
they can or do offer and what users do or can do with such offerings, and
how this whole package is integrated into our living spaces and activities.
I proceed now to the second part of my paper: a suggestion for an aes-
thetics of new-media environments, which I can sketch here only brieﬂy.
In any aesthetics of the new-media environment, a man-made environ-
ment must be the object of aesthetic appreciation, an environment which
consists in and emerges from a gradual integration of newmedia. It is what
Floridi calls the ‘infosphere’—the ever expanding and converging digital
‘encyclopaedic macrocosm of data, information, ideas, knowledge, beliefs,
codiﬁed experiences, memories, images, artistic interpretations and other
mental creations’ (Floridi 1999, 8) which has been gradually evolving since
the 1950s along three fundamental vectors: (a) toward multimedia inform-
ation and virtual reality; (b) toward graphic and immersive interfaces; and
(c) toward integration and convergence of the global network (Floridi 1999,
14-15). According to Floridi,
The infosphere is the whole system of services and documents, en-
coded in any semiotic and physical media, whose contents include
any sort of data, information and knowledge, with no limitation ei-
ther in size, typology or logical structure. Hence it ranges from al-
phanumeric texts and multimedia products to statistical data, from
ﬁlms and hypertexts to whole text-banks and collections of pictures,
from mathematical formulae to sounds and videoclips. (8)
Minimally, infosphere denotes the whole informational environment
constituted by all informational entities, their properties, interac-
tions, processes, and mutual relations. It is an environment com-
parable to, but different from, cyberspace, which is only one of its
sub-regions, as it were, since the infosphere includes offline and ana-
logue spaces of information. Maximally, infosphere is a concept that
can also be used as synonymous with reality, once we interpret the
latter informationally. (2014, 41)
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Signiﬁcantly, this means that in any aesthetics of new-media environments,
aesthetic concerns, properties, and values are essentially wedded to the
philosophy of information. Yet, to adapt a stance from Arnold Berleant,
such environmental aesthetics does not concern gadgets and data-bases
alone. Rather ‘it deals with the conditions under which people join as
participants in an integrated situation’ (Berleant 1992, 12). Thus, aesthetic
value is related both intrinsically to the user’s experience and extrinsically
to the quality of information.
Yet I would like to argue further that the main, most important aes-
thetic category pertaining to the aesthetics of new-media environments
is that of the decorative. That is, my claim is that ornamentality is the
ground-ﬂoor aesthetics of new-media environments (Guter 2010). This
requires some elucidation.
The category of the decorative is ordinarily applied to a variety of pat-
terned artifacts, and also to certain aspects of arts or crafts not normally
thought to be necessarily or primarily decorative, such as architecture and
furniture-making. In a broader sense, ornamentality need not be limited
to the production of particular artifacts as such; it also includes the layout
and interrelations of arrays of objects in the design of lived environments.
In a yet broader sense, ornamentality also encompasses certain processes
involving the transformation of the self, including not only the adornment
of the body but also the shaping of one’s manners, modes of speech, con-
duct, feelings, motives, and thoughts (Alperson 1992, 218).
This broad, inclusive sense of ornamentality is capable of broaching the
multiform complexities and dynamics summoned and exhibited by onlife
experience within the infosphere, wherein narratives are refracted, inter-
laced, restructured, and restored; environments are constantly being adjus-
ted across the online/offline divide as the virtual trails off seamlessly into
the real. Unfolding in time and spread out graphically in virtual space, bits
of information, plucked from the onlife ﬂux, are set in elaborate, dazzling
designs, traversing a whole range of transformations and dislocations of es-
tablished media, like precious stones set in a glittering multi-dimensional
piece of jewelry. This broad, inclusive sense of ornamentality is ripe for
placing the human user in the theoretical limelight and also for accounting
for the user’s important characteristic of being a world-maker, not just an
onlooker.
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So why, how, and when are new-media environments ornamental? One
answer, taken squarely from ordinary experience, readily suggests itself:
at least some of these technologies are conducive to audio-visual styling;
hence they serve a clear decorative purpose as ﬁxtures in our everyday lives,
both online and off. The activated technology often becomes part of the
space in which it inheres in quite a straightforward sense, satisfying the
decorative aim of creating or adjusting one’s ambience. Such a transitive
aspect of the decorative pertains to one of main characteristics of the new
media: their dispersal, or the interweaving of such technologies into our
everyday experience at the levels of consumption, production, and parti-
cipation.
Yet there are further reasons to support the claim that new-media en-
vironments are ornamental, regarding not just their multiform cultural em-
bodiments but also their logically constitutive principles—namely, inter-
activity and hypertextuality.
Here I would like to turn to Kendall Walton’s theory of mimesis as
make-believe, which offers an exceptionally insightful account of orna-
mentation in terms of the inhibition of participation in games of make-
believe (Walton 1990). According toWalton, decorative designs present us
with ﬁctional worlds in which other ﬁctional worlds are embedded. This
puts us at a certain psychological ‘distance’ from the embedded world,
since we participate only in the ﬁrst-order game of make-believe while
imagining that there is another game we could participate in. In Walton’s
words: ‘We stand apart from the internal ﬁctional world and observe it
through its frame’ (284).
Insofar as a representation is ornamental, we inevitably ﬁnd ourselves
withdrawn to the point of beingmerely spectators, rather than participants
in a game of make-believe. We oscillate between the tempting ﬁctional
richness of the internal world and the overpowering sparseness of the fram-
ing world, which consists of ‘scarcely more than the work itself together
with, by implication, its artist and his creative activity’ (287).
We may readily see howWalton’s theoretical apparatus can be adapted
and deployed for our purposes here. For the sake of argument (admitting
that a full-ﬂedged argument is required), let us assume that we may in the
present context replace at no signiﬁcant cost the term ‘ﬁctional’ with the
term ‘virtual’, which (it would be instructive to recall) simply means ‘not
184
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 8, 2016
Eran Guter Toward an Aesthetics of New-Media Environments
actually, but just as if ’.
Most of our onlife experiences can be described quite unproblemat-
ically in terms of using props in a variety of games of make-believe, per-
ceptual or other, wherein such props can be, for instance, other network
users (real or fake), texts, visual images, pop-ups and interactive graphics of
all sorts, computer icons, navigational objects, sound effects, audio-visual
clips, live feeds, and other such stuff as new-media dreams are made on.
Our various games ofmake-believewith these props generate virtual truths
about the props themselves, about virtual worlds, which they inhabit, and
about us, the participants, or rather users. Furthermore, insofar as our on-
life experiences are exclusively mediated by the human-computer inter-
face, information patently takes the form of a display—whether via words,
sounds, graphics, visuals, or even, in certain immersive environments, kin-
esthetic sensations.
The observation that the new media are conducive to audio-visual styl-
ing and hence to decoration readily maps onto Walton’s idea that orna-
mentality is to be explicated in terms of the inhibition of participation
in games of make-believe. For styling simply draws one’s attention to the
way the display is actually produced, hence away from any virtual truth it
may generate. This is clearly the case with the radical kind of audio-visual
styling which is rampant in the new media.
Furthermore, even in the realm of mere text, we can observe pervasive
styling, namely, hypertextuality, undoubtedly one of the key features of
new-media technology, which has already lent itself to artistic use in the
form of hypertextual poetry and prose. Insofar as hypertextual styling
empowers the user to determine the format of the text, thereby deﬂecting
her back to the manner in which the text is generated by the user’s own
performance of reading, it inhibits participation in games of make-believe.
Hypertextual navigation is an instance of interactivity, which can be
deﬁned as the user’s ability to directly intervene in and change the display
being accessed. Interactivity amounts to a world-building activity, which
means that when we digitally interact with the medium, we patently refer
back to the features of the medium itself—we are withdrawn to the way
the display is actually produced. In this sense, I suggest, interaction in
general, and hypertextuality in particular, inhibit participation in games
of make-believe.
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Taking a step further in my argument, I would like to tap once again
into Floridi’s important emphasis on computer technologies as techno-
logies of the self, that is, technologies which enable and empower the
user to conduct inquiries within and across the infosphere, which are self-
generating, self-dislocating, or self-modifying. I would suggest that Wal-
ton’s dual game-world formation may afford a theoretically fruitful angle
concerning one of the most puzzling aspects of onlife experience: a deep-
ening sense of the dissolution of the barriers between the real and the
virtual.
It may be instructive to employ here a valuable distinction, introduced
by R. M. Hare, between the phrastic and the neustic aspects of an utterance
(Hare 1970). By the phrastic, Hare means the propositional content of
the utterance. The neustic is what Hare calls a sign of subscription to the
speech-act that is being performed: it is that part of the sentence which
expresses the speaker’s commitment to the factuality, desirability, etc., of
the propositional content conveyed by the phrastic. Simply put, the dis-
tinction between the phrastic and the neustic is between the content and
the mood or force of a sentence.
My point is this: the features of the medium—which eventually de-
ﬂects the user back to the features of the actual display, hence inhibits
her participation in games of make-believe with its content—perform a
neustic function; they deeply affect the mood or force of the content of
a given display. Thus ornamentality in general hinges upon the neustic—
it concerns not what we say in the sense of coded information, but how
we gesture toward ourselves and others. I suggest that this coheres with
Walton’s claim that decorative designs pull us back to a more ‘objective’
perspective, whichmight yield more signiﬁcant connections with our lives.
Now, as Hamlet says, ‘there’s the rub’.
If the new media are ornamental in this broad, inclusive, pervasive
sense, then, insofar as they are self-modifying, they are ornamental in a
sense very different from, let’s say, ﬂowery wallpaper or Persian rugs. New-
media ornamentality uniquely exempliﬁes ornamentality without abstrac-
tion. A pinkish wallpaper ﬂower may be an abstraction of a particular
ﬂower, exemplifying all ﬂowers of its kind yet no one ﬂower in partic-
ular. On the other hand, new-media ornamentality, insofar as it is self-
modifying, is all about particulars: names, faces, and events—the elements
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of a story.
Granting this, we can now put Walton’s theory to an interesting use.
If, as Walton says, we understand ornamental designs in terms of ﬁctional
worlds in which other ﬁctional worlds are embedded, hence experience the
effect of standing apart from the internal ﬁctional world and observing it
through its frame, that is, a second-order ﬁctional world, which is in a
sense more ‘objective’ or more ‘real’, then new-media displays—at least
when they are mixed-reality displays, not thoroughly ﬁctional—confront
us with a puzzle: their internal worlds are inhabited by denizens of the
real, which becomes somehow ‘less real’ by virtue of our withdrawal into a
more ‘objective’ perspective.
ThusWalton’s dual game-world formation enables one to explain what
is often referred to in rather extravagant terms as a dissolution of the bar-
riers between the real and the virtual in terms of neustic uncertainty: that
is, uncertainty concerning the kind of relationship we, the users, have to
the content mediated.
In ornamentally dense new-media environments, users operate behind
what we might tentatively dub ‘the veil of ornamentality’, echoing John
Rawls ‘veil of ignorance’ albeit in a sense importantly different from the
idea Rawls conceived for his purposes (Rawls 1971). Whereas Rawls’s ori-
ginal ‘veil of ignorance’ assumes ignorance of the identity of particular
real-life situations, the condition of new-media ornamentality leaves them
intact—carefully selected or utterlymade-up—to serve as an openingmove
in elaborate games of self-modifying knowledge-seeking. Yet the very na-
ture of such games—some of their deﬁnitory rules, their goals and desired
strategies—would become ambiguous if the inquirer’s attitude toward her
information sources turns out to be ambiguous as well.
This is clearly the case in masquerade environments such as Second
Life, for instance, which features extreme malleability of data by users,
who can to some extent fabricate immersive environments by digitalmeans.
Within such ornamentally dense new-media environments, typically in-
habited by various software applications designed to emulate human in-
teraction and commonly involving intense role-playing, the identity of the
user is patently rendered ambiguous. Sherry Turkle has forcefully under-
scored this point: ‘In my computer-mediated worlds, the self is multiple,
ﬂuid, and constituted in interaction with machine connections; it is made
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and transformed by language’ (Turkle 1995, 15). In other words, onlife iden-
tity is itself ornamental.
Let me sum up brieﬂy.
In the ﬁrst part of my paper I argued that in the current epoch of ICT
it behooves us to discuss such technologies in relation to their appropri-
ate environments. Thus, an onlife conception of computer art is patently
environmental.
In the second part of my paper I argued that the primary aesthetic
category for any aesthetics of new-media environments is that of the dec-
orative. Ornamentality is the ground-ﬂoor aesthetics for new media en-
vironments. I utilized Kendall Walton’s theory of decorative design with
its distinct dual game-world formation in order to sketch such an envir-
onmental aesthetics and explain the way it is wedded to the philosophy
of information. At the heart of my proposition I emphasized a peculiar
interrogatory complexity, which is meant to address in sober terms one
of the most theoretically puzzling ideas concerning the onlife sphere: the
imminent dissolution of the barriers between the real and the virtual. I
called this ‘neustic uncertainty’. Such complexity is inherent in any game
of knowledge-seeking conducted across the infosphere, which is not re-
stricted to the simplest form of data retrieval, especially in mixed-reality
environments and when the knowledge sought is embodied mimetically.
My theoretical suggestion may pose an interesting and rather unusual
epistemological challenge for aestheticians: to ﬁgure out what would be a
viable logic of virtual discovery under the conditions of new-media orna-
mentality. At any rate, this must be an epistemology which focuses not on
the classic project of justifying already acquired knowledge, but rather on
how knowledge is acquired in the ﬁrst place. And here, as I have suggested,
aesthetic concerns would play an enormously important role.
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